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Executive Summary 
Launched only 6 years ago, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has become a key 
reference document to a majority of developing countries. Africa was the forerunner with respect to 
PRSP, partly together with Latin America. Asia on the other hand has largely been a slow mover. In 
June 2004, 21 African countries had finalised and approved a PRSP, while the number of Asian 
countries was 10. More than 70 developing countries have embarked on a PRSP process. In spite of 
limited substantiation of success, the PRSP approach has continued to evolve. 
PRSP was initiated in the wake of disappointing results from structural adjustment. Nearly 
20 years of economic reforms had not brought poor countries out of poverty. A new toolbox was 
needed and the PRSP was launched as the solution. Key concepts of the new approach were 
ownership and participation. Increased local ownership and broad-based participation should 
presumably correct failures from the adjustment ‘era’. The PRSP not only constitutes a point of 
departure for developing countries’ dialogue with their developing partners, but also claims to be a 
national steering document for poverty reduction. It is therefore a document of potentially great 
impact. When the PRSP was designed, three key groups formed the inner circle: donors, civil 
society and domestic governments. But what about the highest elected public institutions, namely 
parliaments – why did they not form part of the inner circle?  
This report explores why parliaments have come to be marginalised in the PRSP processes. 
Despite variations across continents and among countries embarking on a PRSP process, there is 
one common denominator: weak parliamentary involvement. However, more recently the neglect of 
parliaments has been recognized, but why was the request for parliamentary involvement all of a 
sudden brought to the fore? Existing sources indicate that parliamentary involvement is increasing 
somewhat but has remained extremely limited, despite the World Bank’s and the donor 
community’s recognition of the important role of parliaments in the PRSP process. If it is correct 
that the role of parliament is still marginal, how can this be explained? In order to answer that 
question in more detail, we undertake a case study of Tanzania. Tanzania is in the process of 
implementing its second PRSP. In that regard Tanzania is frequently presented as a PRSP success 
story. Are there any indications of enhanced participation by parliament and individual MPs in the 
second PRSP process? Delving deeper into one single case sheds further light on the mechanisms at 
work in the PRSP process. 
The first part of this report examines whether parliaments should be involved at all in 
PRSPs. The next part of the report gives part of the PRSP narrative, which is important to 
understanding the inherent dynamics of PRSP. The last main part of this report is the case study of 
Tanzania that assesses the first PRSP but more importantly investigates whether parliament became 
more involved in the second round.  
This report argues that there are strong arguments for giving parliaments a say in the pursuit 
of poverty reduction, although there is no blueprint for how countries are to revise their PRSPs. 
Parliaments were more or less totally neglected in the design of PRSP, which can be linked to a 
number of events. In addition, the key actors and initiators of PRSP were not really keen to have 
them involved. This resulted in a number of PRSP processes where ownership became rather 
esoteric, the opposite of stated goals on broad-based participation. 
A main argument of this report is that parliamentary neglect is linked to the dominance of 
the executive in policy processes. Another key argument is that the disregard of parliament is 
strongly related to characteristics inherent in the very PRSP process itself. Five common 
denominators can be discerned: 1) Ownership beyond central ministries or some narrow 
government-technocratic circles appears rather low; 2) Despite improvements in course of the last 
2-3 years, MPs and political parties are generally disengaged from the PRSP process; 3) 
Participation and consultation are still mainly dominated by civil society; 4) The PRSP processes 
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have to a large extent been driven by external actors; 5) Generally the incentives to complete a 
PRSP seem high, but the incentives to put it into practice are not correspondingly strong. 
The initial PRSP approach may have weakened fragile channels of vertical accountability 
between the citizens and their representatives in parliament, as well as horizontal accountability 
channels between parliament and the executive. As several studies show at least in Africa, informal 
accountability channels based on patronage and clientelism may be more important than the formal 
ones. The informal structures may have remained more or less untouched and may even have been 
strengthened under the PRSP partnership regime.  
Even if parliament later becomes involved one has not managed to escape the inherent 
mechanisms at work in PRSP. As is illustrated in the Tanzanian case, even after parliament was 
included to a greater extent in the PRSP process the inclusion did not seem to have any profound 
effect on the dynamics and main channels of accountability of domestic politics, which does not 
give parliament as an institution or individual parliamentarians strong enough incentives to get 
seriously involved. We believe that the findings from Tanzania may be relevant to other countries 
too. 
It gradually dawned on the donors that domestic politics matters and that a deeper 
understanding of domestic politics is imperative for making any further progress with regard to 
PRSP. Parliamentary involvement was therefore later added on, but not mainly as a result of 
domestic demands but rather of external pressure. As is uncovered in the Tanzanian case, the fact 
that parliament has been included to a greater extent in the second PRSP has still allowed it little 
impact on the Mkukuta. The fact that parliamentary involvement has remained limited can be 
explained as a combination of lack of capacity and lack of will. At the same time, both government 
and donors appear in practice ambivalent to any in-depth involvement of parliaments. Due to the 
underlying incentive mechanisms and due to the many competing accountability channels it should 
not be expected that parliamentary involvement will be strengthened overnight.  
The PRSP processes seem to have created new arenas and alliances or new ‘transnational’ 
relationships which exist as some kind of superstructure that is disconnected and floats above 
domestic political processes. At the same time, these relationships somewhat overlap with national 
structures which include both formal and informal structures and channels of accountability. 
The lessons from the first generation PRSPs seem to have given birth to a new development 
co-operation fad: ‘the importance of domestic politics’. Of course it matters. Despite donors’ 
rhetoric about returning ownership and fostering partnership, the changing aid modalities may have 
strengthened donors’ incentives to get more deeply involved in domestic politics. But it is one thing 
to need to understand the dynamics of domestic politics; a totally different and more pertinent issue 
is: what have donors got to do with it?   
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“Parliaments had been overlooked in the design phase of PRSPs” (Parliamentary 
Network on the World Bank 2003) 
Introduction* 
Launched only 6 years ago, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has become a key 
reference document to a majority of developing countries.1 Africa was the forerunner with respect 
to PRSP, partly together with Latin America. Asia on the other hand has largely been a slow mover. 
In June 2004, 21 African countries had finalised and approved a PRSP, while the number of Asian 
countries was 10. In spite of limited substantiation of success, the PRSP approach has continued to 
evolve (Craig and Porter 2003; Booth 2005). More than 70 developing countries have embarked on 
a PRSP process. 
The PRSP not only constitutes a point of departure for developing countries’ dialogue with 
their developing partners, but also claims to be a national steering document for poverty reduction. 
The PRSP affects budgeting issues and sector priorities which normally fall under the mandate of 
National Assemblies.2 According to the World Bank, PRSPs “describe a country’s macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as 
associated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by governments through a participatory 
process involving civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF),”3 and hence make them a document of potentially great 
importance.  
PRSP was initiated in the wake of disappointing results from structural adjustment. Nearly 
20 years of economic reforms had not brought poor countries out of poverty. Instead, in many 
countries the poverty problems were increasing and a growing percentage of public revenues was 
being spent on debt servicing. One important lesson from the adjustment era was that intrusive 
policies loosely anchored nationally had given domestic governments weak incentives to implement 
reforms (Killick 1998). The poor track record of the International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) main 
lending instruments resulted in escalating criticism of the IFIs. A new toolbox was needed. 
Concurrently, aid budgets from Western donors were declining and the bilateral donors were also 
facing a crisis of legitimacy due to the poor results of aid. The PRSP was launched as the solution 
or as a “Third Way” (Craig and Porter 2003).  
 Key concepts of the new approach were ownership and participation. Increased local 
ownership and broad-based participation should presumably correct failures from the adjustment 
‘era’. By letting the developing countries produce the strategies themselves ownership should be 
fostered. It was believed that participation beyond government circles was required. Participation by 
civil society was supposed to guarantee local commitment and ensure locally embedded ownership 
beyond the executive. When the PRSP was designed, three key groups formed the inner circle: 
donors, civil society and domestic governments (Gould 2005). But what about the highest elected 
public institutions, namely parliaments – why did they not form part of the inner circle?  
 As mentioned above, the PRSP involves issues such as macroeconomics and sector 
prioritisation which have major budget implications; the budget is a key parliamentary 
responsibility in most countries. The omission of parliaments appears therefore peculiar. 
                                                     
* This project has been funded by Norad. Thanks to Lise Rakner and Arne Tostensen for comments on an earlier draft. 
The usual disclaimer applies; any errors, whether of omission or commission, are the responsibility of the authors. 
1 Many countries have adopted their own names and acronyms the PRSP document. For the sake of clarity and 
consistency we use the originally term when nothing else is specified. 
2 Representative assemblies are designated by various names. The most common are parliament, legislature and national 
assembly. Here, these concepts will be used interchangeably without drawing a sharp distinction between them. They will 
all be used as synonyms with the legislative branch of government.  
3http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,menuPK:384207~pagePK:1490
18~piPK:149093~theSitePK:384201,00.html  
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Furthermore, the whole rationale of PRSP rests on the imperative of increased local participation to 
ensure domestic accountability. Why then were NGOs that were not necessarily representatively 
elected replacing supreme popular elected institutions? This report will try to explore and explain 
how the role of parliaments has come to be marginalised in the PRSP processes.  
Despite variations across continents and among countries embarking on a PRSP process, 
there is one common denominator: weak parliamentary involvement. However, more recently the 
neglect of parliaments has been recognized, which brings us to the second main research question: 
why was the request for parliamentary involvement all of a sudden brought to the fore? Existing 
sources indicate that parliamentary involvement is increasing somewhat but has remained extremely 
limited, despite the World Bank’s and the donor community’s recognition of the important role of 
parliaments in the PRSP process. This leads us to the third and final key research question: if it is 
correct that the role of parliament is still marginal, how can this be explained? Part of the answer 
may of course be related to the fact that parliaments have only very recently been included in the 
PRSP process. Nonetheless, we believe that the reasons run deeper. In order to answer that question 
in more detail, we undertake a case study of Tanzania that also serves to shed additional light on 
questions one and two. It also serves as an illustrating case for investigating whether lessons have 
been learned from the first PRSP process. Tanzania is in the process of implementing its second 
PRSP. In that regard Tanzania is frequently presented as a PRSP success story. Are there any 
indications of enhanced participation by parliament and individual MPs in the second PRSP 
process? Delving deeper into one single case sheds further light on the mechanisms at work in the 
PRSP process. 
A main argument of this report is that parliamentary neglect is linked to the dominance of 
the executive in policy processes. Another key argument is that the disregard of parliament is 
strongly related to characteristics inherent in the very PRSP process itself. Five common 
denominators can be discerned: 1) Ownership beyond central ministries or some narrow 
government-technocratic circles appears rather low; 2) Despite improvements in course of the last 
2-3 years, MPs and political parties are generally disengaged from the PRSP process; 3) 
Participation and consultation are mainly dominated by civil society; 4) The PRSP processes are to 
a large extent driven by external actors; 5) Generally the incentives to complete a PRSP seem high, 
but the incentives to put it into practice are not correspondingly strong. 
Even if parliament later becomes involved one has not managed to escape the inherent 
mechanisms at work in PRSP. As will be illustrated in the Tanzanian case, even after parliament 
was included to a greater extent in the PRSP process the inclusion did not seem to have any 
profound effect on the dynamics and main channels of accountability of domestic politics, which 
does not give parliament as an institution or individual parliamentarians strong enough incentives to 
get seriously involved. We believe that the findings from Tanzania may be relevant to other 
countries too. 
The first part of this report examines whether parliaments should be involved at all in 
PRSPs. It also discusses the conceptualisation of participation in the PRSP process. The second part 
gives a brief overview of the role of parliaments in the PRSP process with some examples from 
Asian and African countries. The fact that the uptake of PRSP in Asia has been relatively sluggish 
should provide these countries with an opportunity to learn from the African experience. It is also 
interesting to compare Asian and African country cases since many Asian countries are in a much 
stronger position as they are less aid dependent. One would therefore assume that promises of debt 
relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) II initiative and concessional lending 
from the IFIs have been a less attractive carrot to these countries than to many African ones, which 
in itself may have affected the dynamics of the processes. The next part of the report gives part of 
the PRSP narrative, which is important to understanding the inherent dynamics of PRSP. The last 
main part of this report is a case study of Tanzania that assesses the first PRSP but more importantly 
investigates whether parliament became more involved in the second round.  
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Why should parliaments be involved at all?  
As one of three branches of power the legislature is supposed to function as a check on executive 
power, including policy decisions and PRSP implementation, according to Hubli and Mandaville 
(2002). They moreover underscore that engagement of existing governing institutions such as the 
legislature may be necessary at all stages of the PRSP process if the participatory elements of the 
PRSP are to become an enduring part of any country’s policy process (Hubli and Mandaville 2002: 
5). An idealised PRSP cycle is illustrated in figure 1 below: 
 
  
Figure 1: The idealised PRSP cycle (Driscoll and Evans 2004). 
 
Hubli and Mandaville (2002: 3-4) argue that parliament’s participation could reinforce the six core 
principles of PRSP, which are italicized below: 
1) Participatory, country driven and owned: the national assembly is the most representative 
institution in a democracy. It can therefore provide a greater level of ownership and 
legitimacy than other participatory channels.  
2) Results-oriented: formally parliament frequently has a central role to play in the passage of 
enabling legislation so that the PRSP can be implemented. Also, the parliament’s involvement 
through the budget process (but depending on parliament’s formal budgetary powers) may 
affect the allocation of resources.  
3) Comprehensive: parliamentary debates in principle represent a nationally comprehensive view 
of poverty reduction measures.  
4) Prioritisation for feasible implementation: the Assembly provides an arena for (ideally) a 
balanced debate and could function as a check on the interests of the ruling party.  
5) Partnership orientation: parliament could contribute to greater transparency of the PRSP 
process by arranging committee/public hearings, and producing reports. This could in turn 
facilitate donor coordination.  
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and 
evaluation 
Analysis of 
data 
Data 
collection 
Policy 
imple- 
mentation 
Formulation 
of PRSP and 
approval 
Formulation 
of 
policy option 
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6) Medium- and long-term perspectives: broad PRSP support in parliament ensures PRSP 
continuity and resistance to possible setbacks due to changes in the political environment.  
 
The above PRSP principles somehow incorporate one or more of Parliament’s central functions. 
Eberlei and Henn (2003) largely support Hubli and Mandaville’s arguments. In a democracy 
parliaments are the legitimate representatives of the people. Parliamentarians should be actively 
involved in the development of PRSP to ensure that the interests of their constituents are taken care 
of.  
The PRSP could be considered a contract between the citizens and the government, and the 
citizens should be able to hold the government accountable for the commitments made in the PRSP 
– parliament is one possible avenue with respect to this. Also, public financial management reforms 
and PRSP processes depend on each other (Alonso, Judge, and Klugman 2005). Public financial 
management and budget allocations must reflect the principles and content of the PRSP for it to be 
effective. Parliament has a central role to play in this regard, holding the executive to account 
through the budget process (Spanger and Wolff 2003: 52). Even if parliamentary involvement in the 
PRSP process is not legalised in the sense that the PRSP document holds the status as a law or rests 
on parliamentary approval, there are several important reasons why it should be involved. To sum 
up, parliaments could and probably should be involved at several stages of the PRSP cycle (cf. 
Figure 1). 
As will be argued in this report parliamentary involvement has been low in all phases of the 
process in the first generation PRSPs, while in the second generation PRSPs parliamentary 
involvement has been strengthened somewhat although limited to rather unstructured and 
occasional participation. However, it should be underscored that the role of parliaments may also be 
confined by constitution and political system. Here, we shall be careful and avoid sweeping 
generalisations. However, many of the PRSP countries, the African ones in particular, are electoral 
democracies with a dominant executive equipped with wide discretionary powers (Croissant 2004; 
Bratton and van de Walle 1998). This does in itself limit the role of parliaments but does not affect 
parliaments’ core functions, as outlined above.  
Even if there is a strong case for including parliaments in PRSP, more pragmatic 
considerations related to the very state of parliaments in many developing countries may weaken 
the case somewhat. The IFIs and the bilateral donors have always related predominantly with the 
executive and have little experience in dealing with parliamentarians. Despite the many internal 
differences, the better part of the PRSP countries are nascent democracies. Experiences from both 
Africa and Asia indicate that the institutionalisation phase has been difficult and stagnation has been 
the case in several countries. Some Asian countries have even experienced backsliding (Croissant 
2004).4 Parliaments in developing countries have often been associated with particular problems. 
Their legitimacy has often been perceived as low and parliaments are often operating in the shadow 
of an overly dominant executive. Parliaments have been blamed for not functioning as democratic 
organs. In addition, competence and capacity are perceived as low, even if parliaments at least in 
some countries have been strengthened in recent years (Norton 1999; Gyimah-Boadi 2004). If 
strong parliamentary involvement had been formalised already from the outset, key actors such as 
the IFIs and the bilaterals may have feared that the PRSP process would be hampered. This may 
have weakened their incentives to have them involved and may even have impacted on the 
conceptualisation of participation.      
The conceptualisation and the ethnography of participation in PRSP 
Participation has become a buzz-word and is an integrated part of the PRSP approach, but how shall 
participation be defined? Eberlei (2001: 11) points to different forms of political participation with 
                                                     
4 While a majority of African countries have presidential rule, a majority of Asian countries have parliamentary systems. 
The form of governance defines the parliamentary mandate in addition to the Constitution. 
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relevance to PRSP ranging from e.g.: information-sharing, consultation, collaboration, (joint) 
decision-making, and empowerment/control by stakeholders. Eberlei and Henn (2003: 28) 
distinguish between: 1) (minor) substantive participation by the parliament (e.g. in working groups 
and debates); 2) formal participation (parliament adopts the PRSP); 3) involvement of individual 
parliamentarians in consultations; 4) non-participation by parliament. Eberlei argues for a causal 
relationship between institutionalised participation and ownership. Ownership is seen as a 
prerequisite for PRSP to be effective. He defines country ownership as: “A (clear) majority of the 
population and their representatives (democratically legitimated representatives as well as 
representatives of pressure groups) have participated in the development of the strategy, identify 
with the goals and elements of the strategy, and will participate in implementation and ongoing 
development of it” (Eberlei 2001: 11). Ten aspects or dimensions of institutionalised participation 
are identified. The key words here are: sustainable, structurally integrated, thematically embedded, 
politically relevant, broad-based and inclusive, decentralised, qualified, representative, conflict-
aware, and safeguarded by the rule of law (Eberlei 2001: 14-16).   
Piron and Evans (2004: 5) acknowledge that any institutionalisation of participation in 
policymaking would require that the political processes become more open and participative, and 
that this process is beyond the remit of the PRSP exercise. Admittedly this could be seen as an 
ideal, but as we shall see below, both participation and ownership has been treated rather narrowly 
and have included mainly representatives from civil society. Several scholars have argued that the 
groups consulted in the PRSP have not been representatives, as Cornwall and Brock (2005: 1052) 
phrase it: “Country ownership, for example, has seldom meant the participation of democratically 
elected actors in a PRSP process”. Moreover, participation has often meant consultations with no 
strict obligation for governments and donors to take the views of the consulted groups into account. 
The practice has been a “minimalist” interpretation of the concept. 
In order to understand how participation became part and parcel of PRSP we need to 
explore how participation emerged as part of the PRSP agenda. The emergence of participation in 
this context is linked to several currents and events. Cynics have interpreted it as an attempt by the 
Bank to overcome the crisis of the mid-1990s (Fraser 2005: see also sections below). Fraser (2005: 
321) has linked the Bank’s adoption of participation to at least four overlapping processes: 1) A 
response to critical NGOs. Hence, the Bank introduced participation as “safety nets” for its projects; 
2) In the 1990s when bilateral donors started to employ participatory planning mechanisms to their 
project cycles, they pushed the Bank to do the same; 3) In the mid-1990s the Bank started to 
introduce participatory planning also at higher levels such as economic planning; 4) In the late 
1990s participation from civil society was linked to a call for debt relief through the enhanced 
HIPC, which led to the PRSP itself. 
 In the way in which participation was originally linked to PRSP the concept was not seen as 
part of any formal democratic process. Fraser (2005: 322) asserts that participation was not 
introduced because the Bank wanted to change, instead the Bank wanted the other actors “to learn 
from the Bank and implement its knowledge”.  
 This view gets support from numerous scholars. Spanger and Wolff (2003: 52) warn that 
“Phoney participation processes can undermine democratic processes as much as autocratic 
processes do”. McGee et al. (2002) argue that the PRSP processes have not been characterised by 
any real participation, but have been more an information exercise. Craig and Porter (2003: 54) 
claim that participation has often been treated as some kind of “proxy representatives for the 
marginal” and has thus lent “the legitimacy that development actors need to justify their 
interventions” (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 1044).  
 To sum up, the conceptualisation of participation seems problematic. Broad-based national 
participation has largely been synonymous with civil society consultations (Mandaville 2004; 
Eberlei and Henn 2003; Spanger and Wolff 2003). As Craig and Porter (2003: 54) formulate it: “As 
in much of PRSP, the kinds of local participation required, and ownership argued, are 
multidimensional, but politically quite limited in scope, lacking the democratic power of ballot box 
or parliamentary enquiry”. The fact that participation has been conceptually delinked from formal 
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political processes may not have contributed to strengthening good governance and 
democratisation; it may in the worst case have had the opposite effect. Moreover, it seems to have 
had a negative impact on ownership and on the incentives to implement PRSP. In order to 
substantiate this point, a few empirical examples will be given.  
Weak parliamentary involvement: Some examples from 
Asia and Africa  
As mentioned in the introduction, despite the fact that PRSP countries both within Africa and Asia 
and Latin America for that matter are very different with regard to pace and domestic dynamics of 
the PRSP processes, there is one striking similarity: the lack of parliamentary involvement. Some 
examples will be given from Asia and Africa only to substantiate this fact. We will start with the 
late-comers, the Asian countries.  
Cambodia finalised an interim PRSP in 2000, while the National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy was completed in December 2002. In Cambodia the PRSP was hardly discussed in 
parliament. While the Social and Economic Development Plan was presented to parliament, the 
PRSP was not. Parliament’s involvement in the PRSP has mainly been rubberstamping (DFID 
2003; Mozammel and Odugbemi 2005). 
Bangladesh presented a so-called interim PRSP in March 2003. The draft of a full PRSP 
was finalised in late 2004. The interim PRSP was written by a research institute contracted by the 
Government of Bangladesh (GoB). The GoB’s incentives to implement the PRSP and the GoB’s 
ownership to the whole process have therefore been questioned.  Government critics see PRSP as 
donor driven and: “just a country assistance strategy in sheep’s clothing — the same prescriptions 
you would expect from the World Bank” (Green and Curtis 2005: 396). In Bangladesh, political 
debate on the PRSP has largely been absent. The PRSP has hardly been debated in parliament, 
which stands in sharp contrast to what is normally the case with the national development plans. 
However, some improvements have possibly been made lately. Now the Prime Minister is chairing 
a parliamentary-level National Council for Poverty Reduction (DFID 2003). It should be mentioned 
though that according to the final PRSP document and the so-called “Joint Staff Advisory Note” 
prepared by the staffs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development 
Association, both the degree of ownership and parliamentary involvement has been higher than 
what can be drawn from more independent studies and reviews (IDA and IMF 2005; Planning 
Commission 2005). 
In March 2001 Vietnam had an interim PRSP in place, while a full PRSP was completed in 
November 2003. In terms of ownership the PRSP process in Vietnam has often been characterised 
as a success story (Bartholomew and Lister 2005). Still, the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy (CPRGS), which is the local name, has not become an important document beyond 
narrow government circles. According to Conway (2004) the PRSP was for example not an issue at 
the 9th Party Congress of May 2001. Nor was it debated in the National Assembly. While the 
annual Socio Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) is formally approved by the National 
Assembly, the CPRGS was not.5 Conway (2004: 19) holds that one major failure of the drafting 
process of the CPRGS was that it was not linked to domestic political structures. Hence, the CPRGS 
did not become “a major point of reference for domestic political actors”. The whole exercise was 
mainly a top-down process. More recently, however, there have been some changes also in Vietnam 
pointing in the direction of increased parliamentary involvement. For example, Parliament has 
requested that findings from CPRGS consultation processes be circulated among parliamentarians 
(DFID 2003). Nonetheless, Conway (2004) still fears that the lack of ownership beyond a small 
                                                     
5 However, it should be added that this distinction may have become less important more recently since commitments for 
the SEDS are now allegedly supposed to reflect the CPRGS. 
CMI REPORT IN PURSUIT OF POVERTY REDUCTION R 2006: 13 
 7 
political and technocratic circle may be an impediment to implementation. Vietnam will soon 
‘mature’ and become a middle-income country and bilateral donors may start phasing out their aid. 
Conway (2004: 41) believes this will pose as an additional problem: “In the absence of a more 
diversified and empowered National Assembly, it is not clear whether accountability to citizens will 
fill the gap left if donors give up control”.  
Another example can be given from the Pakistani PRSP. In the drafting process any 
involvement by parliament was close to absent. When it later was suggested that the PRSP should 
be presented to parliament, NGOs asserted that this could only be rubberstamping and therefore not 
worthwhile (DFID 2003). Pakistan completed an interim PRSP in November 2001. A full PRSP 
was finalised in December 2003. Several other country cases could be mentioned, the countries 
referred to here are only meant to serve as illustrations, 
Of the aforementioned countries, only Cambodia depends heavily on aid. In Bangladesh for 
example aid constituted as little as 2.4% of Gross National Income in 2000. One would therefore 
assume that for countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam and Pakistan the incentives to complete a PRSP 
would be weak in the first place. Notwithstanding this fact, even to Vietnam, which has a relatively 
strong economy, the benefits of attracting concessional lending from the IMF and the World Bank 
has functioned as an important incentive for completing a PRSP (Bartholomew and Lister 2005). In 
addition, it should be mentioned that out of the four cases that is referred to here it is only 
Bangladesh which falls under the definition of an electoral democracy. Pakistan and Cambodia are 
categorised as so-called ‘failed democracies’, while Vietnam remains an autocratic one-party state 
(Croissant 2004). This may in itself pose certain limits on the role of the national assemblies.    
In Africa on the other hand, the third wave of democratisation reached further. But even if, 
generally speaking the role of parliaments has been somewhat stronger in Africa their involvement 
appears marginal. Langdon and Draman (2005) relate this trend to the dominance of the executive 
in policy processes. Ghana prepared an interim PRSP as far back as 2000, while the full PRSP was 
completed in February 2003. Mozammel and Odugbemi (2005: 40; see also Langdon and Draman 
2005) claim that parliament’s involvement in Ghana has been low. However, some changes have 
taken place more recently: “Parliament has now set up a sub-committee on poverty reduction to 
engage more proactively with the GPRS”. Similar initiatives have newly been taken in a number of 
countries. Mozammel and Odugbemi (2005: 57) mention Tanzania, for instance, where several 
workshops have been set up to raise the MPs’ awareness of the PRSP. 
 Uganda is the first country to embark on a third PRSP. The first full formal PRSP was in 
place in March 2000. It should be mentioned that a home-grown Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP)6 had been finalised already in 1997. This was a local initiative, but the idea was launched at 
seminar between the Government of Uganda and the World Bank in 1995. The Ugandan PEAP 
coincided with the launching of HIPC II. It was agreed therefore that a revisited PEAP which was 
scheduled anyhow should function as a formal PRSP. A second revision or the third PEAP was 
endorsed in 2005. 
Despite the fact that the PEAP in Uganda is a home-grown initiative, it is reported that 
ownership beyond closed government circles is still lacking. Parliament remains an institution for 
rubber stamping (Piron and Norton 2004). MPs were invited to many of the PEAP consultations, 
but few MPs participated. Piron and Norton hold that MPs have no or little ownership of the PEAP. 
It is mainly perceived as a government-donor document. Piron and Norton (2004: 27) suggest that 
“Holding a parliamentary vote on the PEAP, as is done on some other non-legislative issues, would 
enhance its status among parliamentarians”.7 Nonetheless, formal voting on the PEAP is not high on 
the agenda among the key actors. So far the PEAP seems to have had little impact on the work of 
the parliament.  
                                                     
6 PEAP remained as the local name of the Ugandan PRSP. 
7 However, overall, a stronger and more independent Parliament can act as a useful check on government behaviour, 
through monitoring of financial performance and identification of policy alternatives. 
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Due to past experiences and the not too optimistic outcomes of the many PRSP processes, 
bilateral donors as well as the IFIs acknowledge the important role of parliaments in PRSP 
processes. This view is also reflected in the most recent PRSPs (see e.g. Mozambique’s latest PRSP, 
(Republic of Mozambique 2005).8 However, how this is to be done in practice remains unclear. In 
reality both government and donors appear rather ambivalent to giving parliaments more of a say. 
This can be illustrated by the Mozambican case. Both the IFIs and donors stress that the capacity 
and competence of parliament has to be strengthened if it is to serve effectively its scrutinising 
functions of the executive. But as Gerster and Harding (2004: 19) have observed in Mozambique:  
“[…] there are also implicitly concerns, from both government and donors, that the strengthening of 
parliamentary oversight mechanisms could result in greater domestic political influence over 
elements of the reform agenda and decisions regarding budget allocations”. And maybe it is a real 
concern, because as Piron and Norton (2004: 27) hold in the case of Uganda, any further 
strengthening of parliament’s role “could conceivably pose some risks to the PEAP: clientelistic 
motivations might weaken pro-poor allocation, prioritisation processes might become more 
complex as more representatives express their views, and it might become harder for MFPED 
[Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development] to control the budget”. Greater 
parliamentary involvement may hamper possible agreements on the PRSP in the short run. 
However, if parliament is not involved it may have more serious long-term implications. It may 
undermine core parliamentary functions and hinder broader national ownership. 
Again, one should of course be careful with sweeping generalisations based on a limited 
number of cases. The dynamics of the processes differ greatly as well as domestic politics and 
structures of incentives. What is interesting here, however, is that despite the wide variety of 
experiences with PRSP processes parliamentary involvement has been and still is weak.  
Even if HIPC II and the debt relief carrot does not function as an incentive in second or 
even third generation PRSPs, getting access to the IFI’s concessional facilities and the fact that 
many bilateral donors partly link aid, budget support in particular, to PRSP remain a strong 
incentive to embark on a PRSP for most aid-receiving countries. Poor countries have incentives to 
complete a PRSP to make the aid flow, while the IFIs and the donors have a strong drive to disburse 
their funds. Domestic governments and donors alike do not want to complicate the PRSP processes.   
Why parliaments were kept in the cold: How PRSP was 
designed and launched  
In order to fully grasp why parliaments were ignored in the design phase and to understand why 
they are still marginalised one needs to get a little bit of the narrative of the PRSP story. But as 
Christiansen (2003: 9) puts it “there is no single coherent narrative of how the PRSP emerged”. 
Instead it evolved as a result of a number of individual initiatives taken forward by some key events 
(Callaghy 2001). David Booth (2001) describes PRSP as an accidental by-product of the enhanced 
HIPC initiative. That is an important part of the story and does also partly explain why it was 
representatives from the NGO communities that took the last chair around the PRSP table, and why 
it was they who were given the mandate to speak the voice of the poor. The timing of PRSP is also 
key in this regard. As mentioned above the PRSP narrative is complex, but here we will sketch 
some key factors, which are important to understanding why PRSP was designed the way it was and 
why parliaments were locked out. 
                                                     
8 Mozambique had an interim PRSP in place in February 2000, while a full PRSP was finalised in April 2001. The second 
PRSP has just been completed. 
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The failure of structural adjustment and conditionality: The IFIs need 
renewed confidence 
Twenty years of structural adjustment and conditionality had not brought the majority of developing 
countries out of poverty. Especially countries in sub-Saharan Africa were lagging behind. Coercive 
methods of achieving reforms were widely acknowledged as flawed. Several studies of 
conditionality singled out lack of ownership at the recipient ends as a key explanation to the failure 
(Killick 1998; Dollar and Svensson 2000). In addition, it was acknowledged and documented that 
structural and monetary reforms had brought little to the poor. More targeted measures were 
needed. These disappointing results brought the IFIs into a general crisis of legitimacy. Some 
radical changes were forced.  
 In 1995 a new visionary and reform-oriented president, Jim Wolfensohn, was elected to 
lead the World Bank. He responded rather promptly to the crisis facing the Bank, and started a 
process of trying to alter the way in which the Bank operated. Particularly he sought to change the 
image of the Bank, which at the time certainly had a public relations problem. Instead of being 
perceived as a secretive and arrogant lender, his vision was to represent a Bank that was transparent, 
inclusive and responsive to the needs of the developing countries (Christiansen 2003; Selbervik 
2003). 
In 1999 the president himself launched a more comprehensive mode of co-operation than 
had been the approach in the past under the rubric of ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’ 
(Selbervik 2003). Core elements of this new framework were ownership, participation, transparency 
and accountability. The new comprehensive approach was linked to poverty reduction. The World 
Bank’s and the IMF’s concessional lending facilities were renamed, signalling a shift from 
erstwhile policies. The IMF’s soft loan window ESAF was relaunched as the Poverty Reduction 
Growth Facility (PRGF). In line with the new thinking, the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies 
were to be directly linked to the countries’ own strategies. Moreover, the Bank introduced a new 
poverty-related lending device, the Poverty Reduction Support Credit. Both the Bank’s and the 
IMF’s new facilities were directly linked to PRSP (Christiansen 2003; Selbervik 2003).  
 Compared to earlier adjustment loans the number of conditions attached was to be reduced.9 
Instead of stipulations linked to strict deadlines, the concept processual conditionality was 
introduced. PRSP replaced the previous Policy Framework Paper (PFP), which had not proven 
effective as a planning instrument for the developing countries. They were often fully produced in 
Washington and domestic governments felt little ownership of them.10 The PRSP was therefore to 
be produced by the countries themselves. In addition, broad-based participation beyond government 
offices was seen as imperative. Civil society was given the mandate to ensure ownership and 
popular support beyond government circles. To some extent academics and the private sector were 
included too. But what about parliaments, why did they not form part of the original set-up? To an 
outsider it may seem puzzling and at the time few questioned the set-up.  
One cause is linked to the fact that it was the IFIs which initiated PRSP. The Bank for 
example is not mandated to be involved in ‘political issues’.11 The Articles of Agreements have 
provisions preventing political interventions by member countries and precluding non-economic 
consideration: “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members 
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these 
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purpose stated in Article I” 
quoted from (Selbervik 2003: 277). The meaning of the term “political” and “economic” in the 
                                                     
9 However, Tony Killick (2004) holds that despite this rhetoric and despite the fact that the IFIs are still claiming 
conditionality to be ineffective in achieving policy change, in reality poor countries are under the present aid regime 
expected to adjust to an even wider range of policy conditions than was the case in the past.  
10 The PFP was also poorly connected to the World Bank’s operations. 
11http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20261636~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~pi
PK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html  
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context of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement have been subject to dispute and different 
interpretations from the very start. One may argue that the IFIs are indeed involved in politics and 
have been so for decades. It should be underscored however that in the late 1990s and the 
subsequent years the mandate has been assessed as being broader than what has been previously the 
case. Even so at the time including parliaments to the PRSP processes may have been considered 
too political. Adding in civil society was a way of ensuring popular participation but avoiding 
getting involved in ‘politics’. But as many observers have noted, by treating the PRSP processes as 
a purely technical and depoliticised issue may not only have hampered ongoing democratic 
processes, but may also have curtailed domestic ownership (Craig and Porter 2003).  
In order to fully understand the role of civil society in PRSP one also has to take into 
account that the NGO movement was highly instrumental in the very launching of PRSP.  
The debt crisis and the NGO movement 
From the late 1980s the IFIs came under increasing attack from a not insignificant international 
movement: the international NGO community (Callaghy 2001). The movement spread across 
countries and regions and the dynamics of the processes around this movement or, more correctly, 
movements are complex and diverse. Here it suffices to point to the main achievements with regard 
to PRSP and how they impacted on key policy makers. 
The NGO movement gained increasing momentum in the 1990s as a result of growing 
awareness around the debt issues and also the need for more targeted measures in order to tackle 
growing poverty problems. Many of these NGOs had links with partners and NGOs in the south, 
but the main pressure and impact came from NGOs in the north. Most of the critique raised by the 
NGOs was mainly linked to the debt issues, especially through the Jubilee 2000 campaign launched 
in the UK in 1996. The campaign has been described as the most influential popular movement in 
modern times (Yanacopulos 2004). A key event in this regard was the G7 Summit in Birmingham 
in 1998, resulting in the “Drop the Debt” campaign. As many as 300 000 people made a human 
chain around the building where the meeting took place (Christiansen 2003).  Christiansen (2003) 
holds that this particular episode may be seen as a point of departure for what became a global 
protest, and she argues that the launching of the HIPC II initiative is closely linked to this global 
protest (Fraser 2005; Callaghy 2001). 
Another influential actor was the UK-based Oxfam, which linked the debt issue directly to 
poverty reduction (Yanacopulos 2004). Oxfam not only worked on public awareness, but exerted 
direct pressure on bilateral governments and the IFIs. Yanacopulos holds that the NGO movement 
was key to the very launching of the enhanced HIPC (Yanacopulos 2004). Only a few years earlier 
the whole idea of the enhanced HIPC had been totally neglected. However, the fact that some key 
personalities such as the World Bank president himself, and also Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, were 
instrumental and may even have been decisive for both the launching of HIPC II and PRSP should 
not reduce the role of the NGO movement (Christiansen 2003).12 Nonetheless, by linking debt relief 
to poverty within the framework of the PRSP the IFIs cleverly managed at least partially to mend 
fences with the NGO movement and silence some of its critics. At the same time the main lines of 
the IFIs macroeconomic approach remained more or less untouched (Zack-Williams and Mohan 
2005). 
The main point we would like to stress here is that at the time of the launching of PRSP 
strong links had already been established between the IFIs and the NGOs. Since the NGOs had been 
instrumental in the establishing of the enhanced HIPC, which was more or less part and parcel of 
the first generation PRSPs, it was in a way impossible to keep them out in the cold. Including local 
NGOs in the PRSP process was a means of mending fences with a critical Northern NGO 
movement.  
                                                     
12 Much more could be added here, and all the details around what happened and the dynamics of the process should be an 
area of further research. 
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The role of the bilaterals  
By the late 1990s the bilaterals also needed a new legitimation and justification for development 
aid. In 1997 the volume of Western aid reached a historically low level. In the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s many bilaterals made part of their aid conditional upon developing countries reaching 
agreements with the IFIs. One may therefore argue that they were partly to blame for the failures of 
the conditionality era. The bilaterals were in need of new modes of development co-operation 
(Selbervik 2003; Killick 1998). The bilaterals’ embracement of PRSP must also be understood 
against this background. 
At the early stage of PRSP the bilaterals did not seem to question the neglect of parliament 
or the fact that it was mainly civil society groups that were participating in PRSP. One explanation 
can partly be related to their already established relationships with NGOs in the south. Throughout 
the 1990s many bilaterals had tried to foster civil society in developing countries. Broad networks 
and contacts had therefore already been established.  At the time most bilateral donors were 
sceptical about funding of political parties. They would fund political movements only. If and when 
a political movement transformed into a political party, donor support should cease (Selbervik 
1997). Although this attitude was being challenged at the turn of the millennium, at the time of the 
launching of PRSP including parliaments or parliamentarians in the process would probably have 
felt “too political” to the bilaterals. This fact may partly explain why the bilateral donors did not 
pressurise the IFIs to include parliament as one of the main partners in the PRSP processes at this 
early stage. 
To sum up this section, when the PRSP was design and introduced as a concept and as a 
tool – many networks had been built – a special kind of “transboundary13 relationship” had evolved 
(Callaghy 2001). Parliaments were not part of these relationships. Parliament became an ‘add-on’, 
only much later.  
Domestic politics recognised as the missing link: 
Parliaments are ‘added on’ 
“What happens when NGO participation substitutes for the participation of parliament?” 
(Bräutigam 2004: 3). This very timely question was raised by Bräutigam in an article from 2004, 
and she was then not only referring to PRSP but to economic planning and budgeting more 
generally. In a previous article she answered the question even more poignantly and maintained that 
it might contribute to strengthen neo-patrimonial tendencies and clientilistic politics (Bräutigam 
2000). Others have indicated that the practice of marginalising parliaments may have been 
detrimental to any further democratic institutionalisation of the many nascent democracies in 
developing countries (cf. discussion above).    
As soon as the first countries embarked on the PRSP process, numerous evaluations were 
initiated by the IFIs, but not the least by the bilaterals. Many of the first evaluations investigated the 
role of civil society in PRSP. Many of them concluded that civil society participation had been 
unsatisfactory. The NGOs that were consulted were not necessarily representative, and those which 
were consulted were not necessarily listened to. They had little time to prepare and the processes 
were often rushed. Cornwall and Brock (2005: 1052) summarise it like this: “They have usually 
offered limited spaces for engagement to invited CSOs, whose views beyond the consensus, if they 
are expressed at all, seldom find their way into final documents”. They hold that the processes often 
have “run on timetables that disregard the rhythm of the domestic policy process” (Cornwall and 
                                                     
13 The concept ’transnationalism’ is borrowed from (Kassimir and Latham 2001: 276), who claims that “as we define 
them, transboundary relationships become formations when they produce and/or sustain forms of authority and order”. 
Kassimir and Latham (2001) maintain that such formations are prevalent in the South. However, they claim that not all 
relationships that include international, state and local realms fall under the above definition.    
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Brock 2005:1052). Craig and Porter (2003) label this phenomenon as ‘surrogate political 
participation’. In many instances participation from civil society has largely functioned as a 
legitimising device for the donors and for domestic governments.  
 As already argued, the concept of participation was in practice treated rather narrowly and 
delinked from formal democratic processes. Instead, the conceptualisation of participation built on 
an idea about some kind of consensual popular meeting where affected groups could express their 
views. It only gradually dawned on the donor community that bypassing elected institutions was 
problematic in a democratic and good governance perspective. 
Several PRSP evaluations started to point to the fact that parliaments had been marginalised 
and bypassed in the PRSP processes. The studies concluded that participation ought to be 
conceptualised more broadly and implicitly criticised the original set-up of the PRSP. In 2002 a 
World Bank review argued that “the role of Parliaments in the preparation, approval, and 
monitoring of country strategies has generally been limited and is a concern that has been expressed 
by a number of development partners” (World Bank 2002: 9). It seems as if the greatest impetus to 
add parliament into the PRSP process came from some bilateral donors, even if as illustrated above 
the bilaterals may in practice have remained somewhat ambivalent. Also a growing network of 
parliamentarians around the world exerted pressure at the Bank to include parliaments in its work. It 
did not take long before the World Bank responded to the enquiries. A number of initiatives were 
taken. The World Bank has for example developed a special website for parliamentarians and a 
World Bank guide for MPs. The Bank is now engaged with capacity building and extensive training 
programmes for parliamentarians.   
As referred to above, the interpretation ‘political affairs’ in accordance with the Bank’s 
mandate has changed somewhat in recent years. The World Bank now maintains that “Engaging 
elected representatives on development issues and strengthening the capacity of parliamentary 
institutions are important objectives of the World Bank”.14 Already in 2000 at a conference of 
parliamentarians the leadership of the Bank held that “Successful poverty reduction hinges on a 
broad spectrum of policy changes and on wide participation, engaging all of a country’s 
stakeholders. Clearly, parliamentarians around the world must play a role in this process” (World 
Bank 2000: 4). The Bank is moreover stressing the importance of understanding domestic political 
process, which seems to have evolved as a new mantra in course of the last few years (Booth 2005). 
According to the current president of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz: “Development policies are 
not made in a vacuum […] Well-functioning parliaments can help ensure that the voices of the poor 
are heard and that their needs are addressed in the policymaking process.  Against this background, 
the World Bank and Parliamentarians are increasingly working on issues of common interest” 
(World Bank 2005).  
Nonetheless, even after it had been accepted that parliaments should be included to a greater 
extent in the PRSP processes, in practice great scepticism prevailed not only at the Bank, but also 
somewhat paradoxically among the bilateral donors. The donors did not want to complicate the 
PRSP process unnecessarily. Instead they continued opting for speedy results. It seems as if the 
Bank was more or less pressurized to include parliaments.  In practice, parliaments have by and 
large remained marginalised in PRSP. The remaining part of the report investigates the case of 
Tanzania, which serve as a good illustrative case for the main arguments of this report.  
                                                     
14http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20261636~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~pi
PK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html  
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Towards stronger parliamentary involvement in PRSP? 
The Tanzanian experience 
As argued above, despite the third wave of democratisation sweeping developing countries 
institutional reform has so far not properly challenged the prevailing lack of checks and balances. 
The country has so far held three national democratic elections in which the ruling party CCM has 
won with a landslide. The CCM has had an overwhelming majority in the 1995, 2000 and the 2005 
multiparty union national assemblies. Similarly the CCM presidential candidate has won the 
presidential elections by a large margin. Regime transition took place under the guidance of the 
CCM, providing the party with the opportunity to control the process (Tripp 2000). The system still 
vests tremendous powers in the executive and lacks a parliament that can properly challenge it 
(Wang 2005; Wang and Rakner 2005), similarly to many developing countries in Asia and Africa. 
Tanzania has just developed its second-generation PRSP, the National Strategy for Growth 
and Reduction of Poverty or the Mkukuta in Kiswahili.15 The country has had a full PRSP in place 
since December 2000 and is thus one of the pioneers of the PRSP approach. Tanzania became one 
of the first countries to qualify for debt relief within the framework of the PRSP. She has been 
hailed as one of the best adjusters and a positive example, particularly by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, but is generally held in high esteem among development partners as well (Harrison 
2001). All the same, the process of developing and implementing a PRSP has been far from 
flawless.  
The first section of the remaining part of this report gives a brief analysis of the formulation 
process of Tanzania’s first PRSP, which has been criticised for lack of participation by parliament. 
We will then proceed to discuss whether lessons have been learned and parliamentary involvement 
has increased in the second PRSP. In the subsequent sections we investigate whether the PRSP 
process has been linked to other key processes such as the budget process and discuss the degree of 
involvement by parliament or individual MPs in these processes. What are the prospects for 
stronger parliamentary engagement in the Mkukuta? This issue is addressed in the last section of 
this report.  
Formulation of the first PRSP: Compressed timetable 
and limited participation 
The Tanzanian experience with the first PRSP is similar to that of many other PRSP countries. The 
preparation of the first Tanzanian PRSP was subject to a very tight time frame, negatively 
impacting on the consultative exercise. Preparation began in March 2000 and not more than seven 
months elapsed before the final draft was submitted to the boards of the Bank and IMF (Evans and 
Ngalewa 2001). Reaching the HIPC completion point and thus qualifying for debt relief has been 
put forward as the main driver of the process (Gould and Ojanen 2003; OED and IEO 2004:6). A 
rushed consultative process took place in May 2000. Seven zonal workshops were conducted on the 
same day, making it impossible for the participants to prepare adequately. Meaningful contributions 
and interaction were also precluded by lack of available information about the PRSP in advance of 
the excessively rushed consultations. A very limited number of citizens at the village level 
participated (URT 2000). Other workshop participants comprised local authorities (including 
elected representatives) and NGOs (Gould and Ojanen 2003; Evans and Ngalewa 2001). Possibly a 
                                                     
15 The Tanzania case study is based on 33 personal interviews and documents collected in the course of a visit to Dar es 
Salaam in the period 25 June – 10 July 2005 by Vibeke Wang. The group of interviewees comprised parliamentarians (8), 
parliamentary staff (2), development partners (12), representatives from civil society and academia (5), and civil servants 
(6).  
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miniscule number of MPs could have been among the group of elected representatives, but no exact 
information exists in relation to this. In addition, two hours were spent discussing the document 
with parliamentarians in July 2000 (Evans and Ngalewa 2001). This sums up the role of parliament 
in preparing the first Tanzanian PRSP.  
The effect of this lack of participation should not be underestimated as “the most valuable 
aspect of the PRSPs may well be the processes involved in their development” (Grindle 2004). 
Involvement in the formulation of the PRSP (as well as active engagement at later stages) is 
commonly held to be critical to ensuring ownership (cf. discussion above). The role of the Bank and 
IMF has also been criticised as they were to endorse the final document. The image of the process 
as largely externally driven has stuck. Even in government an understanding of the principle of 
participation was not deep (McGee, Hughes, and Levene 2002). While the drafting process 
incorporated civil society successfully according to the World Bank and IMF, the level and effect of 
civil society participation have been disputed by other observers of Tanzanian politics, civil society 
actors, and later also by evaluations conducted by the IFIs themselves (Spanger and Wolff 2003; 
Evans and Ngalewa 2001; McGee, Hughes, and Levene 2002). Nonetheless, civil society 
undoubtedly played a more significant role in the process than parliament.  As the first critical 
voices of the PRSP process gradually emerged in 2001/2002 it was pointed out that the role of 
parliament in the process had been neglected (L'autier 2002). While the Tanzanian legislature 
(‘Bunge’ in Kiswahili) has been largely excluded, the process has been dominated by an iron 
triangle consisting of the executive, donors and a few selected civil society representatives (Gould 
and Ojanen 2003). Is the Mkukuta heralding change? 
The Mkukuta: Learning from the lessons of the first 
PRSP process?   
In the Guide for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Review the government clearly had the experience 
of the previous PRSP in mind when it declared that the review should follow two key principles: 1) 
it should be nationally owned and driven by country interests. Ownership should be achieved 
through improved participatory consultations; 2) the content and timeframe of the review must be 
realistic and achievable. Focus should be on “the importance of participatory dialogue, including 
surveying the poor and effectively engaging elected officials and civil society organisations” (URT 
2003: 4). With the revision of the PRSP and the preparation of the new Mkukuta the impression is 
that there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the government to create a more 
comprehensive process and involve more stakeholders, including parliament.16 It is difficult to 
identify the exact forces behind the development towards a more inclusive and participatory 
revision process in Tanzania. Several actors have been involved, but it is reasonable to anticipate 
that a minimum of government will must have been present for this to take place.  
Whether the bilateral donors had abandoned their ambivalence in the case of Tanzania is a 
bit unclear. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the development partners (DPs) signalled that parliament 
ought to be brought more strongly on board and it is not likely that the effort to strengthen 
parliament’s participation would have taken place in the absence of a push in a more participatory 
direction from external actors. One of the high ranking officials in the Vice President’s Office 
readily admits: ‘there were reasons to include the parliament but even so perhaps we would have 
done it less without the push from the development partners’.17 A representative of the donor 
community plainly states that ‘if there was no pressure from outside they [the government] would 
                                                     
16 The Tanzanian Cabinet endorsed the Mkukuta in February 2005, while the strategy was presented to parliament in April 
2005.  The final version of the Mkukuta was launched in June 2005. The launching was followed up by a public 
information campaign where three documents were circulated, namely the Mkukuta itself in addition to the Mkukuta 
Communication Strategy and a popular version of the strategy. 
17 Interview with VPO official, Policy, Research and Planning division, 08.07.2005.  
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not do these things in the first place.’18 Parliament’s role in advocating for more involvement has 
been minimal. Donors are in fact inclined to think that parliament itself has not had any role in 
demanding greater parliamentary participation, but that a few individual MPs have demanded this 
on their own.19  
Enhanced participation by parliament and individual MPs? 
An outcome of the effort made to actively include more stakeholders in the review process should 
ideally be more meaningful participation. To what extent that has been the case will be investigated 
in the following section.  
As during the excessively short consultation process for the first PRSP, parliament still has 
no formal powers over the review process. In Tanzania the 1977 Constitution (Art. 63, s. 3) 
empowers the Bunge to deliberate upon and authorise any long or short term plan intended to be 
implemented. This is in contrast to most other PRSP countries. All the same, neither the first PRSP 
nor the Mkukuta were laid before the parliament for formal ratification. Formal approval is of 
course no guarantee of substantive participation by parliament although it possibly could encourage 
parliamentarians to engage more actively in the process. The Tanzanian MPs were supposed to 
participate at national fora in workshops and meetings and at district level consultations. The 
consultations were to take place in their constituencies, through the parliamentary committees and 
during the parliamentary sessions in Dodoma (URT 2003). While it has been difficult to establish 
how many MPs were invited and actually participated in the different fora most of the MPs, 
development partners as well as all of the civil society representatives interviewed were sceptical 
about the effect and depth of parliamentary involvement (Mmari et al. 2005). A development 
partner representative refers to the process as simply window-dressing20 while civil society actors 
were unable to identify significant change with respect to the role of parliament.21 A CCM 
committee chair observes: ‘There is not much involvement from parliament. Parliament is just 
rubber stamping. We are just an alibi. We don’t own the Mkukuta. We are not involved. My 
understanding of the Mkukuta is not thorough. It is top-down the whole thing’.22 Not surprisingly 
nearly all the civil servants interviewed were satisfied with the effort made to include parliament: 
‘With the Mkukuta broad consultations were held. They were as wide as you can go in soliciting 
stakeholder views’23 is illustrative of the general attitude.  
At the national level, consultations involving parliament as an institution were limited to 
three briefings held by the government. Other fora where MPs participated include the Poverty 
Policy Week stakeholder meeting, the PER consultative meeting as well as the PRSP consultative 
meeting. However, it is difficult to be heard in these large meetings, and there are few if any 
indications of the MPs actively coordinating their views and statements in the committees or party 
groups before attending. The MPs were also invited to some meetings and workshops on the PRSP. 
The participation was mainly limited to committee chairs, some of the deputy chairs and committee 
secretaries. Among the committees, the committee on environment and natural resources and its 
chair have particularly taken an interest in the PRSP. The committee has worked relatively closely 
with the Vice President’s Office that has had a lead role in the review and is responsible for 
developing a PRSP monitoring framework (Langdon and Draman 2005).24 Unfortunately the 
communication within the committees in advance of meetings, as well as reporting back to 
committee members and other MPs after attending workshops and seminars on the PRSP, have been 
poor. One of the committee chairs frankly states: ‘There is no reporting back after the chairs of the 
                                                     
18 Interview with development partner representative, 01.07.2005. 
19 Interviews with development partner representatives, 28.06.2005; 27.06.2005;  04.07.2005; 27.06.2005. 
20 Interview with development partner representative, 01.07.2005.  
21 Interviews with key civil society representatives, 01.07.2005; and 05.07.2005.  
22 Interview with CCM MP and committee chair, 08.07.2005. 
23 Interview with senior civil servant, MOF, 05.07.2005. 
24 Interview with CCM committee chair, 13.07.2005. 
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committees have participated in different meetings on the Mkukuta. I didn’t know what we were 
going to discuss in advance, but I gave my views’ and then adds ‘There is no place to tell the other 
committee members what has taken place. And you know you need money to call a committee 
meeting’.25 The outcome is that individual MPs rather than parliament as an institution have 
participated in the review process. Information and knowledge on the Mkukuta, in other words, 
have so far been very much concentrated in individuals effectively leading to, as a core civil society 
representative put it: ‘a conflation between parliament as an institution and individual MPs’.26 Partly 
reflecting this lack of internal communication and organisation within parliament, no detailed 
submissions were contributed from the MPs during the preparatory stage of the Mkukuta,27 thus 
reducing their influence on the final product.  As opposed to this, other actors such as development 
partners and civil society have conducted their own analyses and fed them into the process. 
The MPs’ involvement at the grassroots has been even less than at the national level. This is 
in stark contrast to the role the MPs themselves and other stakeholders think they should play in the 
PRSP review (SUNY/Tanzania 2004).28 As one of the parliamentarians maintains: ‘we must be 
involved because we are the link with the grassroots. But we have not been involved in this as I 
would expect us to be…. We say that we should be involved directly but instead we are only 
superficially involved’.29 One of the committee chairs who is quite actively engaged in the PRSP 
sheds further light on the problem ‘Even with this Mkukuta we must first understand it ourselves 
and then we can explain it to our constituents’.30 However, Draman and Langdon (2005:13) note 
that a few activist constituency MPs show commitment to engage more fully with the people on the 
ground and mobilise them in relation to development efforts.      
During the review process a questionnaire with three questions on the Mkukuta was also 
supposed to be distributed by the MPs in their constituencies. In addition CSOs were tasked with 
disseminating questionnaires. The usefulness of this procedure has been limited. Few of the MPs 
mentioned the existence of the questionnaires, indicating that they were not familiar with them. In 
addition it has been claimed that the government has lacked capacity to analyse and consolidate the 
findings. Accordingly they have not been used to inform the revised PRSP (Curran 2005).  
Collaboration between CSOs and parliament could provide the MPs with an increased 
opportunity to assert themselves in the PRSP. But the relationship between civil society and MPs 
has so far been almost non-existent, indicating that the ability of parliament to draw on the expertise 
of civil society is very low. According to the MPs this has gradually started to change since a 
training programme was instigated.31 There is however a long way to go. The extent of 
collaboration in relation to the Mkukuta can largely be narrowed down to the second round of 
consultations in which a network of CSOs sought an audience with the financial and economic 
affairs committee of parliament.32  
A reactive Bunge operating in the shadow of a proactive civil society    
From the above it is clear that although the timetable of the participatory process has been less 
rushed and the government has been relatively clear on the objectives of the consultations, 
parliament and the majority of MPs have by no means been deeply involved in the preparatory 
                                                     
25 Interview with CCM MP, committee chair, 08.07.2005.  
26 Interview with civil society representative, 05.07.2005. Several of the development partner representatives interviewed 
also pointed to this as a problem (interviews with development partner representatives 27.07.2005; 30.06.2005; 
06.07.2005; and 06.07.2005.  
27 Interview with UNDP representative, 05.07.2005. 
28 Interviews with development partners, 06.07.2005; 04.07.2005; 30.06.2005; Interviews civil servants, MOF 05.07.2005; 
MOF 05.07.2005; and VPO 04.07.2005.  
29 Interview with CCM MP, deputy chair 09.07.2005. 
30 Interview with CCM MP, committee chair, 13.07.2005.  
31 A parliamentary technical support programme started in 2003. It is implemented by SUNY/Tanzania and funded by 
DFID and USAID.  
32 Interviews with civil society representatives, 05.07.2005; 06.07.2005.  
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phase of the second PRSP process.33 There are several explanations of this but the MPs tend to 
emphasise a general lack of resources and capacity. This problem has been pointed to in several 
recent studies (e.g. Lawson and Rakner 2005; Biddle, Cassidy and Mukandala 2002; ARD, Inc. 
2003; Wang 2005). Issues like lack of skills, time and adequate research assistance are commonly 
referred to. In addition the 2005 October general elections put its mark on the review process. Many 
MPs were more concerned with keeping their seat in the Bunge than involving themselves in the 
Mkukuta. One CCM MP complained ‘If we had research officers then we could come up with 
salient points. I have not read it [the Mkukuta]. Very few have read it. I had mine through the 
seminar. It came at a very busy time. The interest of the MPs now is coming back to parliament’.34 
The MPs have received information on the Mkukuta in seminars and workshops, but there are 
indications that very few of them on their own have actively searched for and collected information. 
The demand side of access to information is thus more or less absent in parliament, corresponding 
to the fact that supply and control of information are related to control of power. Based on this a 
recent study by IDASA identifies opacity and secretiveness as the prevailing culture in government 
– a hangover from the one-party era (Calland, Dimba, and Naburi 2004: 21 and 24). This is a severe 
problem in a country in which, as one donor representative relates: ‘if parliament does not ask it 
does not get’.35 The CSO leaders interviewed argue along the same lines and describe parliament as 
reactive instead of proactive.36 Parliament’s attitude towards good communication is at best 
haphazard and at worst almost non-existent according to a director of a technical assistance 
programme aimed at strengthening the Tanzania union national assembly.37 A prominent NGO 
leader blames the DPs and accuses them of being ‘lazy in their thinking intellectually. They must 
capture what goes on and how parliament can be strengthened’.38 While this seems overly harsh it 
could be claimed that in the absence of a strong parliament the sustainability of accountability 
within government is in part dependent on pressure from the donor community. 
Although progress has been noted the relative strength of the different actors in the 
preparatory process remains more or less the same. Civil society has so far managed to put its 
impression on the Mkukuta to a greater extent than parliament (see e.g. Curran 2005:11). 
Particularly this is the case with the large and strong Dar es Salaam based CSOs. On a comparative 
scale civil society in Tanzania is still weak but has nonetheless so far had a more prominent position 
in PRSP than the legislature. It actively seeks information on the PRSP and its relative strength vis-
à-vis the legislature is by most stakeholders attributed to the political environment and access to 
resources.39 Civil society has for instance received comparatively more support from donors.  
DPs have not pushed for parliament’s participation in the same way as they have for the 
involvement of civil society. With the gradual opening up of the political space towards the end of 
the 1980s civil society received a boost. This in part reflected a donor preference for channelling 
funds through NGOs which were considered links to the grassroots and thus the poor (Kiondo 
1995). Since then the international development community has increasingly tended to focus its 
attention on civil society actors in addition to the executive. This tendency is also evident in the 
PRSP where participation to a large extent has been equated with civil society (cf. discussion 
above). In relation to this, one of the DP representatives explains ‘there has been a discussion on 
how to shift from external accountability to domestic accountability and the first step is always to 
                                                     
33 Interview with MPs, CCM, 09.07.2005; UDP, 28.06.2005; CCM, 08.07.2005; CCM, 29.06.2005; CUF, 02.07.2005; 
CCM, 08.07.2005; Chadema, 30.06.2005.  
34 Interview with CCM MP, committee chair, 08.07.2005.  
35 Interview with development partner representative, 28.06.2005.  
36 Interview with civil society representatives, 01.07.2005; 05.07.2005.  
37 Bugby-Smith, Donna 2005 ‘Comments and issues on DFID Tanzania research papers entitled “Research on citizens 
access to information and it’s use for greater government accountability and responsiveness”. File note 008/G, 
unpublished manuscript.  
38 Interview with civil society representative, 05.07.2005. 
39 Interview development partners, 05.07.2005, 30.06.2005, 06.07.2005; Interview civil society representatives, 
01.07.2005, 05.07.2005; Interview civil servants, 08.07.2005; 06.07.2005.  
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think about civil society’.40 Demanding stronger involvement by civil society is perceived as less 
controversial than demanding more involvement of the national assembly in PRSP. Being apolitical 
and not interfering in government affairs are evidently principles that are valued highly with respect 
to this by DP representatives. Seemingly, ‘if you push for the involvement of parliament you take a 
clear stance, and most tend not to be comfortable with taking a clearer stance’.41 This has led to a 
situation where the representative element in the review of the second PRSP is by and large derived 
from civil society and to a lesser extent from the democratically elected representative organ in the 
country.  
MPs’ access to central decision-making fora 
As the PRSP is an overarching policy strategy there are several other projects and programmes in 
operation under it, including the Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) and the Public Expenditure 
Review (PER) process. These are related instruments. The PER may in practical terms be 
considered an arm of the PMS as it is supposed to provide input into the preparation of the budget, 
assess budget execution and whether it is in line with the priorities outlined in the PRSP. Originally 
it was a World Bank initiative but from 1998 onwards the government has taken a stronger lead in 
the process. A weakness of the PER is that it does not sufficiently involve the Bunge (see Titsworth, 
Rutashobya and Mushi 2004; Odén and Tinnes 2003). The PER working group organising the 
process is composed of civil servants while the PER macro group also comprises representatives 
from the Bank of Tanzania and development partners. In addition to DPs, the PER sector working 
groups include civil society representatives. The annual PER consultative meeting has wide local 
participation and some parliamentarians are also among the invitees. It has been noted that the MPs’ 
lack of knowledge and participation in the PER compared to DPs and CSOs may in fact weaken 
parliament’s role in and influence on the budget (Odén and Tinnes 2003:35).  
The PMS, in turn, has an even wider approach than the PER. It is supposed to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of poverty trends and their reasons, and function as a framework for 
monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP and other strategies. At the moment the MPs are not 
involved in the PMS at all, but there is an ongoing debate about whether to include the MPs or not. 
It is noteworthy that the MPs are not represented on the PRSP/PMS steering committee although 
several committee chairs in a workshop on the PRSP recommended that parliament should be 
represented on this committee (Langdon and Draman 2005:19). It was also suggested that a PRSP 
technical committee should be established at the parliamentary level (Mushi and Ndumbaro 
2005:25).42 
A common argument against more MP involvement in the above-mentioned fora is that the 
MPs then get involved in the implementation process, the traditional domain of the executive, and 
thus their role in holding the executive to account could be compromised (Mmari et al. 2005:9).43 A 
prominent academic and one of the people highly involved in the review process reasons ‘Their 
[MPs’] place is in the approval of the budget and oversight. If they begin to get into the kitchen this 
is not right…The same goes for the PER as for the PMS’.44 A mix-up of roles could of course 
represent a problem, and involvement in for instance, the PER sector groups may prove impossible 
in practice as these meetings are every other week, thus effectively excluding parliamentarians from 
participating. At the same time there are strong arguments in favour of enhanced parliamentary 
involvement in the PRSP and currently the MPs are clearly disadvantaged by largely being kept 
outside of the PER and PMS. If not formally including them there is always the option of keeping 
                                                     
40 Interview with development partner representative, 06.07.2005. 
41 Interview with development partner representative, 04.07.2005. 
42 The committee on environment and natural resources has been involved in a community-based training programme to 
learn how to act on its own with respect to monitoring PRSP performance. According to the plan the committee is to start 
a pilot project on community-based PRSP monitoring in Tanzania (Langdon and Draman 2005:19).  
43 Interview with key civil servant, VPO, 04.07.2005.  
44 Interview with academic, 06.07.2005.  
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them inside the information loop and being provided the possibility of sitting in on meetings. As 
long as the MPs are completely prevented from participating in these fora they also miss out on an 
opportunity to learn how to influence the PRSP and exercise their oversight role. The CSOs on the 
other hand have learned how to participate from the start and thus have a comparative advantage 
over the MPs.  
Participating when the odds are against you: The Bunge and poverty 
reduction 
While parliament’s participation in the above mentioned fora is considered controversial by several 
stakeholders, most of them stress that parliament has an important role to play in holding the 
executive to account for the implementation of PRSP through the budget cycle. The PRSP defines 
targets for resource allocation and outputs and the means to achieve this is pro-poor budgeting and 
implementation. However, although incremental progress has been witnessed with respect to the 
Mkukuta consultative process the problem remains that the Bunge still holds a marginal position in 
the political system. Parliament’s ability to influence the budget process, and thus its ability to hold 
the executive to account for the poverty reduction goals set out in the first PRSP, has been weak 
(Titsworth, Rutashobya and Mushi 2004; Mmari et al. 2005). There is little reason to believe that 
the legislature’s ability to act effectively as a constraint during the implementation, oversight and 
monitoring of the Mkukuta through the budgetary process should be more potent than in relation to 
the first PRSP. Since the Mkukuta has just entered the stage of implementation one is left to 
speculate, but the obstacles to overcome are many and some are deep-rooted.  
The inability to affect the budget at an early stage 
At the moment it could be argued that the development partners and CSOs have more impact on the 
budget process than parliament. Particularly this is evident at the preparatory stage of the budget 
process (Mmari et al. 2005; Titsworth, Rutashobya, Mushi 2004). Although DPs and CSOs in 
principle only have an advisory role they have the opportunity to put their mark on the budget 
during the initial stages of the process when changes can more easily be made and when the budget 
ceilings are not yet set. The Bunge, on the other hand, has limited formal powers in the budgetary 
process and there is no room for parliamentary input at a stage in the process where policies can 
easily be changed. Currently, the assembly is not engaged in the budget process before the approval 
of the Finance Bill which contains the extent of foreign borrowing. Parliamentary intervention is no 
doubt more likely to be effective at an earlier stage when the budget guidelines are in the process of 
being drafted and key allocations are discussed and can more easily be altered (Naschold and 
Fozzard 2002:46; Titsworth, Rutashobya and Mushi 2004:14). In practice the Bunge can only 
recommend changes within the parameters set by the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) which is a budgeting tool intended to track and facilitate sectoral expenditure. Parliament’s 
role is thus reduced to debating the budget at a fairly detailed level (Daima and ODI 2004:93; 
Naschold and Fozzard 2002:46).  
Engaging parliament more in the budget formulation phase could for instance entail 
opening the way for parliamentary access to the MTEF proposals and the budget guidelines laying 
out the budget strategy before they are distributed to the various ministries, departments and 
agencies (Titsworth, Rutashobya and Mushi 2004: 12 and 14). Presently, the budget guidelines as 
part of the PER process are presented to the development partners and civil society actors before 
they are approved by the cabinet and sent to ministries, departments and agencies. Again, CSOs and 
DPs in principle only have an advisory role. A key technocrat explains that ‘The DPs are not really 
part of the process but they are very important players and contributors. You include them so you 
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can get the confidence that yes the resources are coming’.45 Undeniably this gives the DPs a 
significant leverage over the process. As Hydén (2005) argues, the donor community has markedly 
increased its leverage as agenda setter in recent years. Quite ironically, in the context of a gradual 
shift from project aid to various forms of programme aid (sector-wide approaches) and recently also 
general budget support, there is perhaps an even more strongly felt need among the donors to 
account back to their respective national parliaments to justify the use of their taxpayers’ money.46 
Many bilateral donors are also linking their budget support directly to the PRSP.   
Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight in the budget process  
A promising development with regard to the Mkukuta is a new budgeting tool, the Strategic Budget 
Allocation System, which is now under implementation. It is intended to make it easier to track 
expenditures within the framework of the Mkukuta. A few of the MPs have already received 
training in the use of it. Moreover, a number of ministers explicitly referred to the Mkukuta when 
presenting the ministries estimates during the 2005 parliamentary budget session, thus putting it 
more firmly on the agenda. All the same, the challenges facing parliament in the budget process and 
thus also in holding the executive to account in the PRSP, are many.  
The Bunge’s formal power in the budget process is largely confined to accepting or 
rejecting the budget, although the MPs, at least in theory, can influence the budget through the work 
in sectoral committees. Reducing parliament’s influence over the process is the president’s power of 
dissolution (1977 Constitution, Art. 90 s. 2a-e). The president may dissolve the Bunge and call new 
elections if the national assembly rejects the government budget. Dissolution does, however, require 
a new presidential election (1977 Constitution, Art. 38 s. 2b). The latter is a check on the 
application of the procedure but whether it is a very efficient one is doubtful. So far the CCM has 
had no real competition in the general elections and the CCM hegemony has stood firm. Also, the 
MPs in most cases would do anything to avoid risking their parliamentary seat in a re-election. For 
many not being re-elected would equal losing not only status but also their livelihood. The Bunge 
has no comparable means at its disposal to counter-balance the presidential privilege of 
dissolution.47 A CCM committee chair insists ‘You know parliament is dissolved if we vote against 
the budget. As long as CCM holds a majority in parliament this will never happen’.48 This clearly 
has a negative effect on parliament’s accountability function in the budget process. 
 The MPs particularly stress executive dominance and the ruling party discipline as 
challenging their oversight work (Wang 2005). The incentive for being on good terms with the 
ruling party CCM is excessively strong and indicates a structural problem weakening the 
independence of the MPs. The vigor of debates in the plenary have in fact dampened down since the 
introduction of a multiparty system (Kelsall 2003; Wang 2005). The MPs are not expected to 
question party policy, at least not in the plenary of the Bunge (Msekwa 2000: 76) and the president 
has on occasions made it clear in the meetings of the CCM party caucus that MPs opposing certain 
government-initiated policies will not be able to stand for re-election. Commenting the situation, 
one of the CCM MPs states, ‘we have no say in the budget. We can never say no to the budget. 
There is the party caucus and the three line whip. The ruling party is so strong. This makes it more 
difficult to hold the executive to account. You have to succumb to the mighty’.49 
In sum, it is clear that there has been an absence of meaningful parliamentary participation 
in the preparatory process of the Mkukuta in Tanzania, and that in practical terms no significant 
                                                     
45 Interview with key civil servant, 05.07.2005.  
46 Argument made by development partner in interview, 05.07.2005. 
47 Parliament is empowered to impeach the president, but the procedure is complicated and can only be 
initiated under special circumstances (1977 Constitution Art. 46A). Besides, it enforces juridical compliance 
with the constitution and is thus not an exercise of political control by the Bunge.  
48 Interview with CCM committee chair, 02.07.2005.  
49 Interview with CCM MP, 09.07.2005.  
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improvement has taken place with respect to the involvement of parliament and its influence over 
the process. Taking into account the present status of parliament in the budgetary process and its 
position in the overall politico-administrative system there is no reason to expect immediate change 
in this regard. A reason, cited by the director of a parliamentary technical support programme is that 
‘If you involve parliament there is always the risk of parliament asking embarrassing questions. I 
think it has been concerted not to involve parliament. I see it as a concerted effort not to. This is a 
hang-back from the single party state where everything was merged’.50 Overall, only incremental 
progress has been noted, underlining that opening the way for formal participation is not necessarily 
sufficient to ensure deep engagement in poverty reduction strategy paper processes. 
Domestic politics matter: But what have donors got to 
do with it? 
There are strong arguments for giving parliaments a say in the pursuit of poverty reduction, 
although there is no blueprint for how countries are to revise their PRSPs (Hubli and Mandaville 
2002; PRSP M&S 2004). How deep their involvement should be is an issue for debate. Parliaments 
were more or less totally neglected in the design of PRSP, which can be linked to a number of 
events. In addition, the key actors and initiators of PRSP were not really keen to have them 
involved. This resulted in a number of PRSP processes where ownership became rather esoteric, the 
opposite of stated goals on broad-based participation. The donors and IFIs may have believed that 
they could avoid tricky political involvement by treating PRSP as a purely technical issue, but the 
outcome was PRSP processes that were depoliticised and delinked from domestic policy processes, 
which again negatively affected the status of the PRSP and its implementation. This was also the 
case in Tanzania, despite its status as a PRSP success country.   
On the other hand, the PRSP processes seem to have created new arenas and alliances or 
new ‘transnational’ relationships which exist as some kind of superstructure that is disconnected 
and floats above domestic political processes. At the same time, these relationships somewhat 
overlap with national structures which include both formal and informal structures and channels of 
accountability, but as concluded in a case study of Uganda: “domestic accountability channels are 
not strong enough to match donors’ influence” (Piron and Norton 2004: 39). 
The initial PRSP approach may have weakened fragile channels of vertical accountability 
between the citizens and their representatives in parliament, as well as horizontal accountability 
channels between parliament and the executive. As several studies have shown at least in Africa, 
informal accountability channels based on patronage and clientelism may be more important than 
the formal ones (Mmari et al. 2005; Chabal 1999). The informal structures may have remained more 
or less untouched and may even have been strengthened under the PRSP partnership regime.  
It gradually dawned on the donors that domestic politics matters and that a deeper 
understanding of domestic politics is imperative for making any further progress with regard to 
PRSP. The donors seem to have acknowledged that their knowledge about domestic politics is low. 
Already the first larger reviews of the PRSP processes have concluded that ‘politics matters’ (Booth 
2001) and have contributed to bringing this issue to the fore. Parliamentary involvement was 
therefore later added on, but not mainly as a result of domestic demands but rather of external 
pressure. As was uncovered in the Tanzanian case, the fact that parliament has been included to a 
greater extent in the second PRSP has still allowed it little impact on the Mkukuta. The fact that 
parliamentary involvement has remained limited can be explained as a combination of lack of 
capacity and lack of will. At the same time, both government and donors appear in practice 
ambivalent to any in-depth involvement of parliaments. Due to the underlying incentive 
                                                     
50 Interview with development partner representative, 28.06.2005.  
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mechanisms and due to the many competing accountability channels it should not be expected that 
parliamentary involvement will be strengthened overnight.  
The lessons from the first generation PRSPs seem to have given birth to a new development 
co-operation fad: ‘the importance of domestic politics’. Of course it matters. Despite donors’ 
rhetoric about returning ownership and fostering partnership, the changing aid modalities may have 
strengthened donors’ incentives to get more deeply involved in domestic politics. But it is one thing 
to need to understand the dynamics of domestic politics; a totally different and more pertinent issue 
is: what have donors got to do with it?   
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Embassy 
 
Civil Society and Academics   
 
23 Bernadeta Killian Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, UDSM 
24 Joseph N. Kisanji Coordinator, Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) 
25 Andrew Mushi Policy Advocacy Officer, TANGO 
26 Rakesh R. Rajani Director, Hakielimu 
27 Joseph Semboja Executive Director, REPOA 
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Civil Servants 
 
28 Pascal B. Assey Director, Poverty Eradication Division, Vice President’s 
Office 
29 Mugisha G. Kamugisha Commissioner for Policy Analysis, Ministry of Finance 
30 Ramadhani M. Khijjah Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
31 Laston T. Msongole Director, Policy Information Development, President’s 
Office Planning and Privatisation 
32 Servus Sagday Assistant Director, Policy, Research, Planning, Vice 
President’s Office 
33 Bedason A. Shallanda Assistant Commissioner Macro Policy, Ministry of 
Finance 
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SUMMARY
Launched only 6 years ago, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has become a 
key reference document to a majority of developing countries. More than 70 developing 
countries have embarked on a PRSP process. In spite of limited substantiation of 
success, the PRSP approach has continued to evolve. The PRSP not only constitutes a 
point of departure for developing countries’ dialogue with their developing partners, 
but also claims to be a national steering document for poverty reduction. When the 
PRSP was designed, three key groups formed the inner circle: donors, civil society and 
domestic governments. But what about the highest elected public institutions, namely 
parliaments – why did they not form part of the inner circle? This report explores why 
parliaments have come to be marginalised in the PRSP processes. However, more 
recently the neglect of parliaments has been recognized, but why was the request for 
parliamentary involvement all of a sudden brought to the fore? Existing sources indicate 
that parliamentary involvement is increasing somewhat but has remained extremely 
limited. If it is correct that the role of parliament is still marginal, how can this be 
explained? In order to answer that question in more detail, we undertake a case study of 
Tanzania. Delving deeper into one single case sheds further light on the mechanisms at 
work in the PRSP process. A main argument of this report is that parliamentary neglect 
is linked to the dominance of the executive in policy processes. Another key argument 
is that the disregard of parliament is strongly related to characteristics inherent in the 
very PRSP process itself.
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